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I have labored over 25 years in the law school vineyards. The
vines that I tend sometimes grow strong and hardy, and sometimes
they do not. The fruit my vines produce is sometimes plentiful and
robust, and sometimes not; the wine is sometimes of premium vintage,
and sometimes not. Over the years, I have tested and developed
various methods for stimulating the growth of my vineyard and
maximizing the quality of its produce. This essay is about those
methods and the materials used to implement them.
My vineyard is the field of constitutional law, and in particular,
those parts of the field concerning constitutional analysis and decision
making. The vines are my students. The fruits are their accomplish-
ments and the qualities of mind and heart they develop as students and
later as lawyers and public servants. The wine is the broader identity
of competency and caring, professional and personal integrity, and
clarity of purpose that my students develop over a lifetime in the law.
My primary methods, while I have the students in my classes, are
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problem solving and storytelling.' My materials, at present, are those
in Farber, Eskridge, and Frickey, Constitutional Law: Themes for the
Constitution's Third Century2 (FEF), along with a problem-solving text
of my own3 and informal materials I am collecting as a means of
piecing together constitutional law stories.4
I. WHY PROBLEMS AND STORIES, AND WHY FARBER,
ESKRIDGE, AND FRICKEY?
I emphasize problem-solving and storytelling methodologies
because they help overcome three of the greatest contemporary
challenges of teaching constitutional law. The first challenge is to
counteract students' tendencies to react negatively to constitutional law
as being overly abstract, amorphous, and esoteric. Problems and
stories help meet this challenge by presenting a real-life and practical
perspective on the subject, thus giving concrete life and utility to what
students learn. The second challenge is to facilitate students'
development of an integrated understanding of the subject-what I call
the "big picture" or "forest vs. trees" perspective on constitutional law.
Problems and stories help here by moving students beyond rules,
doctrines, and clause-by-clause views of the Constitution, and helping
them to interrelate theory with practice and substance with process.
The third challenge (common to most law school courses) is to insure
that students are active rather than passive learners, investing
themselves and taking responsibility for their own learning. Problems
help here by allowing students to practice their skills, improve with
practice, and reflect on the "art" of lawyering; stories help by
1. The problem-solving method entails the use of written problems, assigned in advance,
that become the focus for class discussion and provide the opportunity for practicing lawyering
skills; this method is described and evaluated in the section on "The Problem-Solving Method,"
infra Part II. The storytelling method entails the use of true or fictitious stories, told in class or
read in advance, that are a stimulus for student reflection and empathy and may also provide a
backdrop or focus for class discussion; this method is described and evaluated in the section on
"The Storytelling Method," infra Part III.
2. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITU-
TION'S THIRD CENTURY (West 1993) (sometimes hereinafter referred to as "FEF"). The second
edition of FEF was to be published in April 1998. The second edition follows the format and
purposes of the first edition and has about the same number of pages. The modest and well-
considered changes in the second edition indicate the positive evolutionary growth of this work.
Unless otherwise explicitly noted, all page and section citations in this essay are to the first
edition.
3. WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, THE CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(Carolina Academic Press 1992). See also WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO
ACCOMPANY THE CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Carolina Academic
Press 1993) (on disk).
4. See notes 114-21, infra, and accompanying text.
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stimulating student interest and by engaging students' emotions as well
as their intellects in the learning process.
I continue to work on interrelating the problem-solving and
storytelling methodologies. Their compatibility seems clear. A well-
drafted problem, after all, usually tells a story; and a client usually has
a story to tell which the lawyer elicits and develops as part of the
problem-solving process.' It should follow, then, that the two
methods can be used to accomplish similar goals6 and that, with
careful planning, they will be mutually reinforcing. That is my
experience thus far.
Prior to using FEF, I used the first two editions of Stone,
Seidman, Sunstein, and Tushnet, Constitutional Law,7 and before that
I used two or three editions of Gunther, Constitutional Law.' In
earlier years I also used the first edition of Brest, Processes of Constitu-
tional Decisionmaking9 and two editions of Lockhart, Kamisar, and
Choper, Constitutional Law."0
I selected the FEF casebook and continue to use it in part because
it includes both stories and problems. In particular, I was impressed
by its case study on Brown v. Board of Education" that occupies all
of Chapter 2 and is presented in the form of a story.12  The case
study is an excellent vehicle for introducing the constitutional decision
making process and its complexities in a legal and social context that
engages students' interest. I also selected the FEF casebook in part
because it places the individual rights materials before the materials on
federal powers.' 3 I wanted to experiment with this reversed order and
thus far have been satisfied-largely because the rights materials (like
the Brown case study) engage student interest better than the powers
materials. They also set a more contemporary and practical tone for
the course that focuses students on issues they are more likely to
confront in practice. In addition, I thought FEF to be more compact
5. See Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 241, 256 (1992). "A problem is .... an integrated story with elements that must
be identified, extracted, and organized into a coherent structure .... The lawyer gets a story
[from the client], and must sort out interrelated issues based on the questions to be resolved and
the rules of law that apply." Id.
6. See text at notes 26-30, infra.
7. Now in its third edition (1996), and now published by Aspen, successor to Little, Brown.
8. Now Gunther & Sullivan, and now in its 13th edition (Foundation, 1997).
9. Now Brest & Levinson, and now in its third edition (Little, Brown (now Aspen), 1992).
10. Now Lockhart, Kamisar, Choper, Shiffrin, and Fallon, and now in its 8th edition (West
1996).
11. 349 U.S. 294 (1954), reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 52-56.
12. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 33-132.
13. See notes 51 and 67-69, infra, and accompanying text.
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than most other constitutional law casebooks and to contain more
useful background information and other guidance for students. And,
as my bottom line, I thought the FEF materials and the authors'
approach to the subject would support the type of academically
rigorous and challenging course presentation to which I am committed.
In general, my experience with the FEF casebook has confirmed all of
my initial reasons for selecting it.
II. THE PROBLEM-SOLVING METHOD
The problem-solving method is not the same as the traditional
method of using hypotheticals in conjunction with case analysis. The
problem-solving method has several distinct characteristics:
The first feature is, of course, the problem. The problem involves
several issues cutting across several cases and statutes. It is meant
to resemble a complex situation that a lawyer might face in practice.
The problem may be framed in the context of litigation, negotia-
tions, drafting, or planning. The student must approach the
problem in a specified role, such as advocate, judge, advisor,
planner, legislator, or law clerk to any of these.
The second feature is the advance distribution of the problem.
Students are expected to work on the problem at home and come to
class prepared to discuss it. Whereas the hypothetical sprung
during class calls for "thinking on your feet," the take-home
problem gives the student time for in-depth, well-organized legal
analysis.
The third feature is that the problem is the focus of the class
discussion .... The assigned cases, statutes, and other materials
become tools for helping to solve the problem. A Socratic discus-
sion of the cases ... still occurs, because the students must
understand the cases in order to analyze the problem. But the
students must do much more. They must analyze a new complex
set of facts, organize the issues into a logical framework, read the
relevant authorities with an eye towards resolving the client's
concerns, and apply the authorities to the facts of the problem. In
class, the professor guides the discussion around these tasks.14
The problem method as thus described can be used effectively in
both introductory and advanced courses and in both large and small
classes. 5 This method can be a particularly potent pedagogical
technique in constitutional law courses, lending a concreteness and
14. Moskovitz, supra note 5, at 250.
15. Id. at 261-63. See generally James Eagar, Comment: The Right Tool for the Job: The
Effective Use of Pedagogical Methods in Legal Education, 32 GONZ. L. REv. 389, 404-06 (1997).
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practicality to what may otherwise appear to be an ephemeral and
esoteric subject. The problem method can also help demystify
constitutional law and make it more accessible for students.
Problem solving is receiving increased attention in legal education
generally. The value of the method and the importance of the skill are
increasingly recognized. In an influential 1992 report, a task force of
the American Bar Association included "Problem Solving" as the first
on its list of "the fundamental lawyering skills essential to competent
representation" and called problem solving one of the two "conceptual
foundations for virtually all aspects of legal practice .... ""
As Kurtz, Wylie, and Gold emphasize, "[k]nowledge is not itself
the most powerful of all resources open to a practicing academic or
lawyer. Rather, as knowledge grows and develops and itself becomes
unmanageable, . . . [it is necessary] to appreciate the importance of
acquiring the intellectual skills and abilities necessary to acquire
knowledge, process information, solve problems and evaluate re-
sults."17 Problem-solving methods are adapted to the acquisition of
such skills, and these methods have "potential for application across
learning objectives and styles ... and individual student preferenc-
es."' 8 A problem method of instruction "challenges both instructor
and participant to learn and to learn to learn . . . . [I]f we can
empower our graduates to learn to learn throughout their personal and
professional lives, we will have accomplished the highest learning goal
possible."' 9
In my own view, for an introductory constitutional law course, the
most basic and pervasive objective to be achieved through problem
solving is the enhancement of the student's capacities for more complex
levels of legal analysis. Legal analysis is itself a fundamental lawyering
skill that goes hand-in-hand with problem solving.2" Using problems
to teach legal analysis allows the instructor to move beyond the narrow
confines of the case-by-case approach emphasizing individual case
analysis and the traditional "hypothetical" based primarily on a single
16. The Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession, Narrowing the Gap: Legal
Education and Professional Development, an Educational Continuum 135, 141-157 (ABA (1992))
[hereinafter Narrowing the Gap]. For other helpful discussions of legal problem-solving methods
in the law school curriculum, see Suzanne Kurtz et al., Problem-Based Learning: An Alternative
Approach to Legal Education, 13 DALHOUSIE L.J. 797 (1990); Moskovitz, supra note 5; Stephen
Nathanson, The Role of Problem Solving in Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167 (1989); and
Gregory L. Ogden, The Problem Method in Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 654 (1984).
17. Kurtz et al., supra note 16, at 816.
18. Id. at 797.
19. Id.
20. Narrowing the Gap, supra note 16, at 151-57.
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case or issue." In particular, as Narrowing the Gap emphasizes, "a
lawyer should be familiar with the skills and concepts involved in
analyzing and synthesizing the pertinent legal rules and principles in
light of the facts" and, in doing so, should be capable of "[b]reaking
legal rules down into their component parts (elements, 'factors,''considerations,' competing interests, and so forth), and relating the
facts at hand to each of these components . "..."22
Problem-solving methods can also influence instructional
objectives and outcomes in at least two other positive ways in an
introductory constitutional law course (and in other law school
courses). First, problem solving counters the narrow and sometimes
misleading perspective students may attain from a concentrated diet of
appellate court opinions, opening up new vistas of dispute-resolution
forums other than courts, dispute-resolution techniques other than
litigation, and lawyering competencies other than courtroom advocacy.
Second, problem solving moves students beyond knowing the law to
applying the law, beyond the comfortable confines of settled rules and
holdings to new challenges in sometimes unsettled territory, thus
stretching students' minds and providing them a better sense of
themselves as lawyers as well as learners.
To be more specific, there are many concrete objectives that may
be achieved or enhanced by use of problem-solving methods in
constitutional law courses. In basic courses, these objectives include
the following:
1. Engaging students in deeper levels of legal analysis:
a. moving beyond individual cases and their applications:
the synthesis of substantive law;23
b. gathering facts and working with incomplete facts;
c. deepening understanding of constitutional law concepts
and methods (developing new insights and perspectives by
working with new applications of the law).
2. Moving from theory to practice: injecting concreteness and
realism into what may otherwise appear to students as an
overly abstract subject matter.
21. See the comparison between problems and hypotheticals in note 98, infra.
22. Narrowing the Gap, supra note 16, at 152.
23. In Bloom's taxonomy of educational objectives, synthesis is the fifth of six types of
learning, as ranked in ascending order of difficulty: knowledge, comprehension, application,
analysis, synthesis, evaluation. BENJAMIN BLOOM, TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES:
HANDBOOK I: COGNITIVE DOMAIN (1956). As Moskovitz notes, supra note 5, at 247,
"Problem-solving helps students to move up this ladder."
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3. Introducing students to lawyering forums other than appellate
courts and lawyering competencies other than advocacy.
4. Introducing students to notions of lawyering roles, lawyering
tasks, and professional responsibilities to clients.
5. Engaging students in active (vs. passive) learning and stimulat-
ing them to "learn to learn."
6. Helping students develop coherent views of the various
substantive areas of constitutional law and a holistic view of
the overall subject matter.
In addition, the problem-solving methodology can provide a
foundation for collaborative learning in constitutional law. The
instructor could, for example, divide the class into small working
groups and use problems as the focus of work assignments for the
student groups.24 If the instructor were to assign particular roles to
different groups, or to different students within a group, then a small
measure of experiential learning could be added to the collaborative
process. In upper-level courses the collaborative and experiential
aspects of the problem-solving method can be greatly expanded, of
course, by the use of simulations and role-plays.25
III. THE STORYTELLING METHOD
Stories, like problems, can add reality and humanity to students'
perceptions of constitutional law. Through the lens of stories, students
can explore life experiences of real people in real struggles experiencing
real hurt; and can understand that the courts and the other governmen-
tal institutions operating under the Constitution, depending on time
and circumstance, may either contribute to the struggles and hurt or
help alleviate them. Moreover, through stories students can experience
the challenges lawyers face, their successes and failures, and the ways
that they may cause as well as alleviate hurt. In so doing, stories-like
problems--can challenge students with new understandings of law's
applications and lawyers' roles, thus moving students out of their
comfort zones and expanding their horizons.
Stories can also do some things that problems do not do, or do not
do as well. Stories, for instance, "can stir imagination in ways that
more conventional discourse cannot. '2 6 Stories can elicit emotional
responses from students and thus engage the affective domain more
24. See generally Zelda Gamson, Collaborative Learning Comes of Age, CHANGE, Sept./Oct.
1994, 44, at 46-49.
25. See generally Eagar, supra note 15, at 407-09.
26. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2415 (1989).
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effectively than problems. And while problems and stories can both
depict reality, stories do a better job of setting the scene for confronta-
tions with reality in which students come face-to-face with circum-
stances that are unfamiliar and unsettling:
Perhaps the story prompts a response that feels inconsistent with
other strongly held views or intuitions. Perhaps the experience of
a response to the story is itself troubling because it occurs on levels
not easily summarized by principles, logical analysis, or other
specific modes of reasoning that seem more generally accessible or
rationally defensible.27
Moreover, stories can give voice to the life experiences of
marginalized and downtrodden persons in society, thus presenting
alternative perspectives that may not be fully represented in conven-
tional law.2" In this and other ways, stories "can shake up some
assumptions,"29 and can occasion student reflection on whether the
received legal wisdom is indeed wise and the prevailing legal principles
indeed "right" and "just." As Martha Minow states, storytelling
"disrupt[s] . . . rationalizing, generalizing modes of analysis with a
reminder of human beings and their feelings, quirky developments, and
textured vitality."3
Let me be clear that I am addressing the use of stories in the law
school classroom, not in legal scholarship as such. It has been my
observation that storytelling in legal scholarship has been more
discussed in the literature than storytelling for teaching purposes.
Moreover, storytelling in legal scholarship is the subject of a lively
contemporary debate between supporters and critics. One major point
of contention, for example, concerns the relationship (or lack thereof)
between legal storytelling and rational legal discourse-in particular,
whether storytelling scholarship emphasizes attitude and emotion at the
expense of rational analysis and, if so, whether this is good or bad.31
27. Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in PETER BROOKS & PAUL GEWIRTZ eds., LAW'S
STORIES 24, 26 (Yale U. Press 1996).
28. See generally BROOKS & GEWIRTZ, supra note 27; GARY BELLOW & MARTHA
MINOW, eds., LAW STORIES (U. of Mich. Press 1996).
29. Minow, supra note 27, at 29.
30. Minow, supra note 27, at 36.
31. Overviews of the debate may be found in three essays in BROOKS & GEWIRTZ, supra
note 27: Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, at 2-7; Peter Brooks, The Law as
Narrative and Rhetoric, at 14-17; and Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Legal Storytelling and
Constitutional Law: The Medium and the Message, at 37-53. (The coauthor of the last essay is
the Farber of Farber, Eskridge, and Frickey.) See generally Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87
MICHIGAN L. REv. 2073 (1989).
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Some of the criticism of stories in legal scholarship, however, may
aptly be applied to stories in the classroom. For example, "Stories
alone do not articulate principles likely to provide consistency in
generalizations to guide future action; stories do not generate guides for
what to heed or what additional stories to elicit. Stories on their own
offer little guidance for evaluating competing stories. ' 32  Moreover,
a story is not "morally neutral, for it always seeks to induce a point of
view. Storytelling . . . is never innocent. If you listen with attention
to a story well told, you are implicated by and in it."33 The use of
stories thus presents some danger (as may the use of some other
teaching techniques) that the instructor could play with students'
emotions in order to indoctrinate them with viewpoints to which he or
she is partial.
How might an instructor heed these cautions about the use of the
storytelling method? I have several suggestions. First, use storytelling
only to supplement legal analysis and rational discourse, not to replace
them.34 Second, be sensitive to the partiality of stories generally and,
in particular, the stories that you tell; and be willing to acknowledge
this partiality to the class. Third, emphasize and respect the particu-
lars of the story, and be wary of generalizing beyond the story's own
context. Fourth, use stories more to "increase the range of understand-
ings among listeners"3 than to narrow that range. If you use a story
to channel student thinking, make sure the channel is reasonably wide
and includes access to various tributaries for further exploration. Fifth,
when you discuss the meaning of a story with the class, avoid being
overly directive. As you suggest themes the story addresses, draw out
perspectives the story presents, or elicit student responses to the story,
reserve ample room for students to do their own reflecting and reach
their own conclusions. Avoid "the-moral-of-the-story-is .
statements.
It also follows, from the cautions about the storytelling method
and these suggestions for heeding them, that stories are highly selective
and should be chosen with close attention to pedagogical goals. At
least two major choices are involved at the initial stages of selection.
The first is whether to select stories that are already in the law-that
32. Minow, supra note 27, at 35.
33. Brooks, The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric, supra note 31, at 16. Martha Minow
illustrates this characteristic of storytelling by demonstrating the difficulties of telling a story about
the Jewish community involved in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Louis
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). Minow, supra note 27, at 31.
34. See Minow, supra note 27, at 36.
35. Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, supra note 31, at 6.
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is, stories that can, in part, be found and documented in court opinions
and other legal records-as opposed to stories that derive solely from
other sources such as literature, history, and oral tradition. I use both
types but usually prefer the former. With a law-based story, the
instructor can focus on what happened before the litigation but was not
in the court records because it was considered legally irrelevant or
unimportant, or was unknown at the time. The story I use about
Mildred and Richard Loving is an example. 6 Similarly, the instruc-
tor can focus on what happened after the litigation that sheds further
light on how law impacts people's lives. The story I use about the
Cruzan family is an example.37  There are also two stories in
FEF-the Brown story" and the Carrie Buck story39-that are law-
based and cover both the before and after of litigation.
The second choice is whether to select true stories or fictitious
stories. Again, I use both, but my clear preference is the "true" story
(a story we consider to be true as best we can tell given the difficulties
of objectively ascertaining truth). Law-based stories are generally true
in this sense, although that is not always the case.4" Stories drawn
from history are also true in this sense; my story of the "Okies" is an
example.4 In contrast, stories drawn from literature or oral traditions
may be fictitious-for example, the story of the Joad family in the
Grapes of Wrath42-but may nevertheless provide important insights
into constitutional law and may have a basis in fact even though the
genre is fiction. In short, there is a broad range of sources from which
effective story selections may be made.
IV. THE CONTENT OF THE FARBER, ESKRIDGE, AND
FRICKEY CASEBOOK
Professors Farber, Eskridge, and Frickey identify two major
purposes of an introductory constitutional law course: (1) to "give
students a sound grasp of judicial doctrine,"43 and (2) to provide
36. See text accompanying notes 113-14, infra.
37. See text accompanying notes 115-16, infra.
38. See notes 100-10, infra, and accompanying text.
39. See notes 111-12, infra, and accompanying text.
40. See L.H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW As FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE
RHETORIC OF AUTHORITY 2-3 (Penn State U. Press, 1995), which asserts that constitutional law
opinions set forth many stories that are legal fictions used for rhetorical purposes. LaRue defines
stories broadly, e.g., the "story of growth" told by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland. Id. at 70-92 (ch. 3).
41. See text accompanying notes 117-18, infra.
42. See note 117, infra.
43. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at v.
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students an understanding of how "basic questions about the nature of
... [American] society" pervade constitutional law." To advance
these goals, the authors "emphasi[ze] the cutting edge of the law"
throughout the text.4" Their thesis, evident in both the structure and
substance of the text, is that "constitutional law generally, and
dramatically after Brown [v. Board of Education], is incomprehensible
without understanding social and political movements which shape its
agenda. '"46 Thus, after presenting an excellent introductory overview
of constitutional law and United States Supreme Court history,47 the
text departs from traditional patterns for studying constitutional law by
using Brown as the first primary case. The authors consider Brown to
be "the most important reference point for public-law thinking since
the 1950's and ... an important testing case for the 'grand theories' of
constitutional law ... ."48 Their discussion of Brown lays the
foundation for consideration of judicial decisonmaking and its impact
on racial desegregation as well as other contemporary issues addressed
in the remainder of the text.
The text also departs from traditional norms of presenting
constitutional law by the manner in which it presents Brown. Rather
than the standard case excerpts followed by notes and questions, the
coverage of Brown begins with the story of the events leading up to the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision and includes much of the aftermath as
well.49 The authors' intent is to "introduce the constitutional process
as a part of the legal process" while generating student enthusiasm for
the course material right from the start.5"
Following the Brown case study are the materials on individual
rights. The authors address rights issues before power issues (again
departing from traditional norms of presentation) because these
materials flow naturally from the discussion of Brown and because
"[t]he modern constitutional tradition is an individual rights tradition
.. .. ,," The recurring theme in the rights materials is "[h]ow does
and how should the Constitution mediate the tendency toward
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at vii.
47. Id. (Chapter 1).
48. Id. at vi.
49. Id. at 33-131; see also id. at 1097-1127.
50. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY CONSTITUTION-
AL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 5 (1993) [hereinafter
TEACHER'S MANUAL]; see also FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at vi.
51. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at vi.
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exclusion and suppression in a multicultural polity? '5 2 The individu-
al rights portion of the text begins with a chapter (Chapter 3) on equal
protection that emphasizes race discrimination materials"a  and
establishes a smooth transition from the Brown case study. These
materials cover facial racial classifications that disadvantage minorities
or evidence racial hostility (e.g., Loving v. Virginia),4 facially neutral
regulations with racially disproportionate effects (e.g., Yick Wo v.
Hopkins),5" the state action concept in the context of race discrimina-
tion (e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis), 6 Congressional authority to enforce
civil rights (e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan),7 and affirmative action (e.g.,
City of Richmond v. Croson)."8
Chapter 4 continues to address equal protection, but in the
context of classifying factors other than race. 9 The first section of
this chapter reviews the history and current status of rational basis
review; the second section focuses on gender classifications and the
levels of equal protection scrutiny as they have been applied to varying
types of gender-based discrimination, and includes a consideration of
current issues on maternity leave statutes6" and single-sex schools; 61
and the third section addresses other types of classifications, in
particular, classifications by sexual orientation.
Chapter 5 shifts attention from equal protection to substantive and
procedural due process. The general theme of the Constitution's role
in our multicultural polity and the emphasis on the "cutting edge of
the law" continue to characterize the Chapter 5 materials. The chapter
also provides a link back to equal protection and chapters 3 and 4
through its discussion of fundamental interest analysis under the equal
protection clause.62 The "right-to -privacy" cases-from procreation,
to abortion, to consensual sexual activity, to the right to die-are of
course the primary focus of Chapter 5. These materials are inherently
exciting and contentious, and the authors do a good job of drawing out
their potential.
S2. Id. at vii.
53. Id. at 133-286.
54. 388 U.S. 1 (1967), reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 138-41.
55. 118 U.S. 356 (1886), reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 146-47.
56. 407 U.S. 163 (1972), reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 196-201.
57. 384 U.S. 641 (1966), reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 218-22.
58. 488 U.S. 469 (1989), reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 256-66.
59. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 287-380.
60. Id. at 344-53.
61. Id. at 353-59.
62. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 441-79.
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The Chapter 6 materials focus on the First Amendment and,
according to the authors, are "more densely doctrinal. ' 63 Neverthe-
less, the authors maintain continuity with earlier chapters by emphasiz-
ing the role that free speech and press rights can play in fighting racial
and gender oppression.64 The chapter begins with contemporary
materials on hate speech and other modes of offensive speech, followed
by the classic cases on incitement, libel, obscenity, offensive speech,
commercial speech, and speech via campaign expenditure.6 Then
come cases and materials on speech in the public forum, prior
restraints, overbreadth and vagueness, freedom of association, and
freedom of religion.66
At the conclusion of the individual rights materials, the text
reverts to the traditional starting place for constitutional law courses,
namely, structural constitutional issues. These issues begin in Chapter
7 with materials on federalism. The standard casebook materials on
powers delegated to Congress (the commerce power, taxing and
spending powers, treaty powers) are included, as well as intergovern-
mental immunities (e.g., New York v. United States)67 and federalistic
limits on state power. The latter materials cover the "dormant
commerce clause," the interstate privileges and immunities clause, and
the preemption doctrine.68 Chapter 8 then moves from federalism to
separation of powers within the federal government. It includes
coverage of the problem of "aggrandizement" (or the "Imperial
Presidency"), the problem of "sloughing off" (or the "Lazy Congress"),
and the problem of reshuffling disputes and judges.69
The FEF text concludes in Chapter 9 with materials on constitu-
tional remedies that provide a fitting conclusion for the book and an
opportunity to revisit and reflect on the various themes it develops.
This chapter considers the constitutional and prudential barriers to
adjudication presented by the political question doctrine, the standing
70doctrine, and other doctrines governing access to court, as well as
issues concerning immunities from suit (or from damage awards) for
state and federal governments and officials.7' The chapter then
63. Id. at viii.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 581-663.
66. Id. at 663-772.
67. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 850-59.
68. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 862-915.
69. Id. at 917-1026. In the second edition, "sloughing off" has become "legislative over-
reaching" (or the "Meddlesome Congress").
70. Id. at 1028-83.
71. Id. at 1083-97.
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concludes with a return to the Brown case study. The authors
reconsider Brown in the context of modern public law litigation7 2 and
present several recent cases (e.g., Freeman v. Pitts)7 3 that the authors
view as signs of a retreat from Brown and a limit on desegregation
remedies in the 1990s and beyond.
Throughout these materials, the cases are selected judiciously and
are often heavily edited. The heavy editing serves the purpose of
making the cases (and the materials overall) manageable for an
introductory course. I believe that the editing is sometimes so heavy-
handed, however, that passages critical for instructional purposes are
eliminated. The edited version of Roe v. Wade,74 for example, does
not include the Court's statement of the applicable standard of
review;75 and the edited version of United States v. Darby76 does not
include the Court's important statement about Congressional motive
and purpose.77 (In the second edition, each of these missing state-
ments has been added into the respective cases.)78
The FEF casebook is accompanied by two auxiliary resources: a
cumulative annual supplement,79 and a teacher's manual.8" Each
72. Id. at 1097-1127.
73. 503 U.S. 467 (1992), reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1115-24. In the
second edition of FEF, Freeman v. Pitts is condensed and moved to Chapter 2, and is replaced
by Missouri v. Jenkins II (495 U.S. 33 (1990)) and III (515 U.S. 70 (1995)). See FEF, 2d ed., pp.
1084-1088. Moreover, the authors have added a short essay, "Concluding Thoughts on the
Supreme Court as Part of the Political System," to the end of Chapter 9 in the second edition
(FEF, 2d ed., pp. 1088-1090).
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 503-09.
75. "When certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation
limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,'... and that legislative
enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
76. 312 U.S. 100 (1941), reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 806-09.
77. "The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the
legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over
which the courts are given no control." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
78. See FARBER ET AL., (2d ed) p. 497 (quoting from Roe) and FARBER ET AL., p. 786
(quoting from Darby).
79. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., 1997 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY (West,
1997) [hereinafter FARBER ET AL., 1997 SUPPLEMENT]. Most of the material in this supplement
has been reedited and included in the second edition (see supra note 2). The second edition will
then have its own supplements, beginning with a tentatively planned 1998 supplement covering
the 1997-1998 Term of the Court. Interview by William A. Kaplin with Philip P. Frickey,
Faegre & Benson Professor of Law, University of Minnesota (March 1998).
80. TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 50. A new edition of the Teacher's Manual, keyed
to the new second edition of the casebook (see supa note 2), should be available by fall 1998.
William A. Kaplin interview with Philip P. Frickey, Faegre & Benson Professor of Law,
University of Minnesota (March 1998).
[Vol. 21:885
Problem Solving & Storytelling
supplement for the first edition contains court opinions and other
materials from late in the 1992-93 Term through the end of the most
recent Court term, 1 as well as additional problems. The 1997
Supplement also directs attention to what the authors consider to be
the emerging constitutional law issue of the 1990s: "the extent to
which the Constitution protects gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals from
discriminatory treatment. ' 12 Supplements for the second edition will
begin with cases and other materials from the 1997-1998 Term of the
Court.
The Teacher's Manual provides lecture suggestions, topics for class
discussions, and focal points for in-class analysis of issues-all of
which correspond to the chapters, cases, and problems that appear in
FEF. The manual also provides advice for the new teacher of
constitutional law (or the experienced teacher seeking to learn new
tricks)-for example, how to link key concepts in the course as the
class progresses through the text. The manual concludes with a
suggested syllabus setting out alternative arrangements for courses with
more limited subject matter coverage or credit allocations.8 3
As one might expect, when several professors collaborate on a
casebook, each brings his own teaching skills, tactics, and methodology
to the enterprise. The authors of FEF acknowledge this fact in their
Teacher's Manual when they attempt to distill each of their own
teaching preferences into a group of collective suggestions about how
the text may best be used in teaching constitutional law. The manual
is not an attempt to impose the authors' collective theory as the only"right way" to use the text; rather, it is intended to provide "some
basic points as well as some more advanced pedagogical sugges-
tions." "
V. PROBLEM-SOLVING IN FARBER, ESKRIDGE, AND FRICKEY
The authors clearly expect that their text will be used for courses
employing the traditional case method of instruction. The opportunity
to use the materials for an alternative "problem method" approach
cannot be ignored, however, since 24 problems or problem sets appear
throughout the text. (The second edition" has a considerably larger
81. FARBER ET AL., 1997 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 79, at iii.
82. Id.
83. For complimentary comments on the FEF Teacher's Manual, see Eric Muller, A New
Law Teacher's Guide to Choosing a Casebook, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 557, 565-67, nn.21, 22, 24, 26,
29 (1995).
84. TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 50, at iii.
85. See note 2, supra.
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number of problems.) While the authors apparently did not intend
that FEF would revolutionize both the methods and the substantive
organization of constitutional law courses, their materials do neverthe-
less support the alternative problem-solving method and its attendant
benefits in conjunction with the case method. 6
Problems appear frequently throughout the individual rights
materials. The problems range in length from a few sentences to
several paragraphs with the exception of one longer problem that
appears near the end of the individual rights materials.8 7  The
problems present hypothetical scenarios that raise contemporary legal
issues whose resolution requires students to apply the cases and
materials in the immediately preceding pages and sections.
Through the individual rights problems, the authors ask students
questions leading them to apply what is sometimes old law to very
contemporary and hotly disputed issues. The following are some
illustrative examples of the problems presented in the text: (1) In light
of the materials on equal protection, students are asked to consider a
state requirement that applicants for the state police force indicate their
sexual preference on applications coupled with a state practice of
informing applicants who reveal they are homosexual that they are not
eligible for employment;88 (2) in light of both the due process and
equal protection clauses, students are asked to consider a state prison
rule providing that inmates may not become married while in prison
unless they have the approval of the prison superintendent; 9 and (3)
in light of the First Amendment material on freedom of expression,
students are asked to consider several issues regarding students' posting
of placards in the entry foyer of a law school building.9"
The equal protection and due process materials culminate with a
review problem asking students to consider the rights of unmarried
parents with respect to their biological children.91  The problem
requires students to consider the potentially applicable law and make
the most persuasive argument. In effect, it offers the opportunity to
86. For a discussion of the problem-solving method and how it complements the case
method, see Gregory Ogden, The Problem Method in Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 654
(1984). Compare Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach with Problems,
42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241 (1992), which argues that the problem-solving method should replace the
case method.
87. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 578-80.
88. Id. at 379. In the second edition, this problem is replaced with one on the military's
Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy. FARBER ET AL., 2d ed., p. 374-75.
89. Id. at 560. This problem is deleted from the second edition.
90. Id. at 596-97. See also FARBER ET AL., 2d ed., p. 577.
91. Id. at 578-80.
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confront a final exam-type question before moving into a new set of
materials on the First Amendment.
Problems appear more sporadically in the FEF materials on
federal powers. Like the individual rights problems, the power
problems ask students to apply existing law to modern and contentious
hypothetical situations. Examples include: (1) a problem set regarding
federal regulation of nuclear energy that requires students to address
preemption issues;92 and (2) a problem concerning the justiciability of
a challenge to the President's power to declare war against Iraq without
first obtaining a congressional declaration of war, or at least reporting
to Congress pursuant to the War Powers Resolution.93 Problems
such as these support a pro-active approach to structural constitutional
issues that allows students to confront the most ensconced of constitu-
tional traditions in a modern setting and somewhat nontraditional
manner.
The casebook, as expected, does not include suggested answers to
the problems or other guidelines for resolving them: that is generally
left to the individual instructor. The problems are frequently
mentioned in the authors' Teacher's Manual,94 however, and the
manual occasionally does include answer guidelines or suggestions for
using the problems in class assignments or discussions. The major
example is the manual's discussion of the six problems that appear at
the end of Chapter 1 in the casebook.9"
While the problems usually do not ask students to assume specific
roles, and usually contain only a minimal amount of new facts, they do
challenge students to explore their understanding of the legal issues and
confront the most unclear or complex elements of the case precedents.
In this sense, many of the FEF problems are more like traditional
classroom "hypos" than full-scale problems,96 but with the advantage
of being available to students for study before class. Instructors
seeking to employ a more fully developed problem-solving methodolo-
gy, using longer and more complex problems, may wish to add roles
92. Id. at 913-15.
93. Id. at 1041-42. See also 50 U.S.C. § 1541.
94. See TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 50, 2-4, 39-40, 86, 90, 96, 139.
95. TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 50, at 2-4 (discussing problems on FEF p. 27).
96. Moskovitz, supra note 5, at 246, explains that "[A] hypo is not a problem. A hypo
usually raises only one or two issues. A problem raises several issues, which must be organized
before each can be separately analyzed .... Clients come to lawyers with problems, not hypos.
A lawyer trained to analyze a hypo has not been trained to analyze a longer problem." See also
Moskovitz, supra note 5, at 250, which describes the "three essential features" of problems.
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and other enhancements to the FEF problems,97 or may obtain more
complex problems from other sources. 8
VI. STORYTELLING IN FARBER, ESKRIDGE, AND FRICKEY
The authors introduce storytelling methodology in Chapter 2.
The focus is the case-study on Brown v. Board of Education," set
forth in the form of a "story"."' As the Teacher's Manual suggests,
"One way to think about the chapter is that it tells a story .... The
story of Brown is, in large part, the story of courageous people and
efficacious strategies." '' To tell the Brown story, the authors must
also tell "the story of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 1 2  In turn, to
further understanding of Brown and the Supreme Court's role in the
litigation, the authors revert to the story of Marbury v. Madison. °3
"One of the uses of Brown in this chapter is to set up the Marbury
discussion .... Brown gives the students a contemporary reason to
wonder about judicial review ... ."104
Chapter 2 is probably the best and most important chapter in the
book. It introduces themes central to the study of constitutional law
and provides a kind of backbone that structures and helps integrate the
other chapters. Moreover, because much of this chapter is in the form
of a story-a compelling story, well-told-the materials engage the
students' interest, provide concreteness to what might otherwise be
esoteric inquiries, and encourage student thinking about the institution-
al role of the courts and the roles of lawyers.
In fact, I am so convinced of the value of the Brown case study
that I have extended it in my own course. I have done that by
integrating other casebook materials into the case study-in particular,
selected materials on state action, 05 on Congress' authority to enforce
97. I do this for the free speech problem about posting placards (note 90, supra, and
accompanying text), which I think is a highly effective problem and better yet with some
embellishment.
98. For example, KAPLIN, supra note 3, includes 14 complex, role-based problems along
with an appendix of review guidelines (pp. 249-269) for each problem and various sets of
"analytical frameworks" (e.g., pp. 91-93) for use in problem-solving. In any given year, I will use
about 10 of these 14 problems in my introductory course.
99. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 33-52. This is followed by the Court's opinion in
Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in id. at 52-60, and notes on the opinion.
100. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 33 n.1; Teacher's Manual, supra note 50, at 7.
101. TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 50, at 5, 8.
102. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 35 n.1. This story is set out on FEF pp. 35-40.
103. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 60-74, including the Court's opinion in Marbury, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 61-70.
104. TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 50, at 10.
105. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 172-213 (Chapter 3, Section 2.A.&B).
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the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments, °6 and on Congress' power to
regulate race discrimination under the commerce clause. 7 I assign
McCulloch v. Maryland'° to introduce the study of Congressional (v.
state) powers, and I ask students to "go back in time" from Brown to
McCulloch just as I had earlier asked them to go back from Brown to
Marbury, °9 thus treating both Marbury and McCulloch as a "story
within a story." I introduce these additional case study materials by
asking, respectively, about the applicability of Brown to private schools,
about Congress' role in prohibiting race discrimination in public
schools and other public settings, and about Congress' role in
prohibiting race discrimination in private schools and the private
sector. The result is a more comprehensive case study that can fill
several weeks of the course, and that underscores and supplements the
authors' objectives by interrelating rights issues with power issues,
introducing some substantive law of both rights and powers, comparing
the judicial and Congressional roles in constitutional decisionmaking,
and contrasting separation of powers issues with federalism issues.
The authors' storytelling methodology is mostly confined to
Chapter 2. Chapter 9, however, does include a continuation of the
Brown story that provides a fitting end to the casebook."' And in
Chapter 5, the authors do tell one other substantial story-the tragedy
of Carrie Buck, the young woman whose institutionalization and
sterilization was unsuccessfully challenged in Buck v. Bell."' The
authors effectively use this story to introduce the role of fundamental
rights analysis," 2 and I use it for the same purpose in my course.
To supplement the Brown story and the Carrie Buck story, I have
added other stories to my course, and I am continuing to develop
them. First is the story of Mildred and Richard Loving, the interracial
couple whose conviction under a miscegenation statute was invalidated
in Loving v Virginia."' I am enhancing this story with new informa-
tion recently presented at a conference at my law school."' Second
106. Id. at 213-38 (Chapter 3, Section 2.C).
107. Id. at 774-86 (Chapter 7) (discussion of McCulloch v. Maryland). Id. at 813-20
(Chapter 7) (discussion of Heart of Atlanta v. U.S. and Katzenbach v. McClung).
108. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 774-83.
109. See text accompanying note 104, supra.
110. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1097-1127; see also notes 72-73, supra, and
accompanying text.
111. 274 U.S. 200 (1927); FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 404-07.
112. FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 404-07.
113. 388 U.S. 1 (1967), reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 138-41.
114. Robert A. Pratt, The Drama of Loving: An Interracial Couple Meets the Courts,
Remarks at Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After Thirty Years, (Nov. 19-
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is the story of the Cruzan family, whose daughter Nancy was the
subject of the U.S. Supreme Court's first right-to-die case, Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health."' This compelling story
extends far beyond the Court's decision and culminates with the
apparent suicide of Nancy's father, Joe." 6 Third is the story of the
"Okies" who migrated during the Depression from the "Dust Bowl"
of the Midwest to the West Coast."7 This story provides a perspec-
tive from which to consider the freedom of interstate movement and
can be personalized into the substory of Fred Edwards, who was
prosecuted for driving his unemployed and impoverished brother-in-
law, Frank Duncan, from Texas into California, and whose plight
reached the U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards v. California."8  In a
somewhat different vein, at the beginning of the course I also use the
story of "The Prince's Cook"-a magnificent story about the art of ox
butchering-to introduce storytelling to the students and to make some
points about the "art" of law study and practice." 9
In times past, I have also told other stories that, upon reevalua-
tion, I no longer use, either because they now seem antiquated to the
students or because I now spend less time on the constitutional issues
related to the story. A primary example is the story of David O'Brien,
the 19-year-old college student who burned his draft card on the South
Boston Courthouse steps and whose conviction for violating the
Universal Military Training and Service Act was affirmed in United
21, 1997), cosponsored by the schools of law of The Catholic University of America, Howard
University, and Brigham Young University. Robert A. Pratt is an associate professor of history
at the University of Georgia. His presentation from the conference will be published in vol. 41,
no. 2 of the Howard Law Journal under the title "Crossing the Color Line."
115. 497 U.S. 261 (1990), reprinted in FARBER ET AL., supra note 2, at 553-59.
116. See, e.g., Father in Right-to-Die Case Kills Himself, THE DES MOINES REGISTER, Aug.
20, 1996, at 3.
117. John Steinbeck frequently reported on this story during-his days as a journalist in
California and later memorialized the story in his novel The Grapes of Wrath (1939), for which
he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in 1940, and which was subsequently adapted into both a
movie (starring Henry Fonda) and a play.
118. 314 U.S. 160 (1941). This case is referenced in FEF at page 478 but is not set out or
summarized. See also REPORT OF SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING NATIONAL DEFENSE
MIGRATION, 77TH CONG., 1st Sess. (1941) (which is subtitled "Analysis of Material Bearing on
the Economic and Social Aspects of the Case of Fred F. Edwards v. the People of the State of
California").
119. The story of "The Prince's Cook" was told by Chuang Tzu, a Chinese Monk in
ancient times. See Cutting Up an Ox, in THE WAY OF CHUANG Tzu 64-67 (Thomas Merton
(trans.), Shambhala 1992). The story was rediscovered and used with great effectiveness by
Professor Siliciano of Cornell Law School in a graduation speech. See John Siliciano, A Campfire
of the Mind, CORNELL LAW FORUM, v. 22, no. 2, pp. 9-13 (Nov. 1995).
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States v. O'Brien.2 ° In context, this story also includes some en-
lightening legislative history about Congress' motives and methods in
passing the 1995 draft-card burning amendment to the Act.' 21
Usually I tell these stories myself during class time. Sometimes
I solicit student reaction, often emphasizing affective reactions more
than cognitive. At other times I suggest one or two points to be drawn
from the story rather than engaging the class in discussion, or I merely
ask the students to reflect on the story.
VII. CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE
Many pedagogical challenges confront both instructors and
students in constitutional law courses. For the instructor, pedagogical
choices abound regarding course goals, 122 teaching methods,123 and
instructional materials. 124  Each choice is important given the chal-
lenges of teaching the course, and each choice should be confronted
with due regard for its pedagogical consequences and its interrelation
with the other choices to be made.
The Farber, Eskridge, and Frickey casebook will support a range
of traditional teaching methods. It will also support both the problem
solving and storytelling methods, and for me the book works well in
this respect. Most of the problems in FEF are narrow in scope,
however, and the stories are limited in number. I therefore use other
materials in conjunction with FEF, and other instructors would also
likely need supplementary materials to effectuate substantial use of
either the problem-solving or the storytelling method. 21
Personally I am committed to the problem-solving method. My
commitment grows the more I develop the method and materials to
support it. I would advocate use of this method by others for
constitutional law as well as other law school courses. I am also
attracted to the storytelling method and believe it to be complementary
to the problem-solving method. Though I am just in the process of
120. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
121. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b)(6). The legislative history of this amendment is summarized
in Paul Brest & Sanford Levinson, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 935-937
(3d ed., 1992).
122. For a suggested set of course goals for the introductory constitutional law course, see
KAPLIN, supra note 3, at 9. For a general taxonomy of educational goals, see BLOOM, supra note
23.
123. See generally Eagar, supra note 15.
124. For suggestions on selecting one type of course material, see Muller, supra note 83.
125. For a suggestion about additional problems for a constitutional law course, see notes
97-98, supra, and accompanying text. For suggestions about additional stories, see notes 113-21,
supra, and accompanying text.
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developing my own storytelling materials, and am still working out the
relationships between this method and problem solving, I am close to
the point of advocating the storytelling method as well, either in
combination with problem solving or in combination with other
instructional methods. Both the problem-solving and story-telling
methods, I believe, help my vines to grow stronger and to produce
more plentiful and robust fruit as well as more premium vintage wine.
